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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Samantha Jo Karsten (Sistrunk) timely appeals from the district court's order 
reducing her felony conviction to a misdemeanor conviction. On appeal, Karsten 
argues that the district court abused its discretion when it failed to set her guilty 
plea and dismiss her judgment of conviction. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
When Ms. Karsten was twenty years old, she dated a man Timothy 
Ferguson. (R., p.101.) One night, Ms. Karsten, Mr. Ferguson, and one of the couple's 
friends, Josh Schmitz, were bowling in Twin Falls, Idaho. (R., pp.11, 101.) The group 
wanted to return to their homes in Boise, Idaho, but did not have enough money to 
make the trip. (R., p.11.) Mr. Ferguson remembered that he had previously loaned 
Steve Weir some money so Mr. Weir could make a rent payment. (R., p.11.) The 
group decided to go to Mr. Weir's apartment and demand that Mr. Weir repay his debt. 
(R., p.11.) Mr. Ferguson told Ms. Karsten that he planned to threaten Mr. Weir in the 
event he refused to repay his debt. (R., p.11.) 
Ms. Karsten was the only sober person in the group, so she drove the other two 
men to Mr. Weir's apartment. (R., p.101.) Ms. Karsten remained in the car while 
Mr. Ferguson and Mr. Schmitz approached Mr. Weir's apartment. (R., p.101.) While in 
the apartment, Mr. Ferguson and Mr. Schmitz threatened Mr. Weir with a gun and took 
$100, in addition to some other personal items, from Mr. Weir. (R., pp.10-12.) 
Ms. Karsten learned that Mr. Weir was threatened with a gun after Mr. Ferguson and 
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Mr. Schmitz returned to her car. (R., p.101.) Mr. Weir reported the incident to the 
police and Ms. Karsten was eventually arrested. (R., pp.10-12.) 
Ms. Karsten was charged, by information, with aiding and abetting robbery. 
(R., pp.48-49.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Ms. Karsten pleaded guilty to an 
amended charge of aiding and abetting aggravated assault and, in return, the State 
agreed to recommend probation. (R., pp.54-64, 67-68.) Thereafter, the district court 
imposed a unified sentence of five years, with three years fixed, but suspended the 
sentence and placed Ms. Karsten on a three-year period of probation. (R., pp.79-83.) 
Over five years after Ms. Karsten was placed on probation, she filed a motion to 
set aside her guilty plea and dismiss her judgment of conviction. (R., pp.98-92.) In 
support of her motion, Ms. Karsten submitted an affidavit indicating that at all times she 
complied with the terms of her probation. (R., pp.101-102.) She also informed the 
district court that she had paid all of the fines and costs associated with this case. 
(R., p.102.) She told the court that she ended her relationship with Mr. Ferguson, 
married a different man, had two children, and was pregnant with a third child. 
(R., p.102.) She also told the court that the instant matter was her only criminal offense, 
and constituted behavior which was entirely out of her character. (R., p.102.) 
Ms. Karsten also told the court that in May of 2014 she was scheduled to graduate from 
Brown Mackie College, with a Medical Assistance Degree. (R., p.102.) Her defense 
counsel stated that her judgment of conviction will limit her employment opportunities in 
the medical industry. (R., p.99.) 
A hearing was held on Ms. Karsten's motion, wherein Ms. Karsten argued 
pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604(1 ), that the district court had the authority to set aside her 
guilty plea and dismiss her judgment of conviction. (Tr., p.4, L.23 - p.6, L.15.) The 
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State disagreed and argued, based on the fact that her probation had expired, that the 
district court only had the authority pursuant I.C. § 19-2604(3) to reduce Ms. Karsten's 
conviction from a felony to a misdemeanor. (Tr., p.6, L.17 - p.7, L.13.) However, the 
State then stipulated to a reduction of Ms. Karsten's conviction from a felony to a 
misdemeanor. (Tr., p.7, Ls.2-8.) 
The district court begrudgingly ruled as follows: 
THE COURT: Okay, here is the problem. I have ruled on this issue. 
I hope that I am wrong with my ruling. I'll say that to you. I said that when 
I made the ruling. I'll say it again and again. This is the most ridiculous 
statute that I've ever seen, but here is the problem. Earlier this last year 
the Idaho Supreme Court decided State versus Guess, and in a lengthy 
footnote Justice Eismann pointed out that the language of 19-2604( 1) 
seems to say on its face that when the legislature used the language "the 
Court may, if convinced by a showing made there is no longer cause for 
continuing the period of probation," that you have to make the motion 
before probation expires. Makes no sense to me whatsoever. Logically 
judicially, fairness, but that's the way -- It was dicta. I admit it's dicta. The 
[S]upreme [C]ourt has never ruled on it. I have issued two opinions from 
this Court saying that if that's what the statute says, it's not my prerogative 
to amend it. I invited people to appeal. I invite you to appeal this case 
because I think the ruling I'm about to make makes no sense. But 
sometimes that's the way it goes. 
My interpretation is that probation has expired in this case; 
therefore, subsection (1) doesn't apply, subsection (3) does. State 
stipulated to a misdemeanor, I'll certainly grant that relief, but I can't grant 
the other relief. And again, please take this up. Can I say it more 
forcefully? Because I think we need to get an interpretation of the statute. 
I will reduce this case to a misdemeanor at this time without prejudice to 
your client to come back and to reconsider that in the event of a [holding] 
from the [S]upreme [C]ourt that I'm wrong. I think I can do that. In other 
words, it's without prejudice to file this motion again. If I'm wrong, then I'll 
grant the relief, because I have no doubt that Ms. Karsten has done very 
well and deserves the relief. I can't do it. 
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(Tr., p.7, L:17 - p.9, L9.) Thereafter, the district court entered a written order 
comporting with the foregoing bench ruling. (R., pp.107-109.) Ms. Karsten timely 
appealed. (R., 111-113.) 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed to set aside Ms. Karsten's guilty 
plea and dismiss her judgment of conviction? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Failed To Set Aside Ms. Karsten's 
Guilty Plea And Dismiss Her Judgment Of Conviction 
A. Introduction 
Ms. Karsten argues that I.C. § 19-2604(1) is ambiguous because are two 
reasonable interpretations of that statute. The final paragraph of I.C. § 19-2604(1) 
provides, "the court may, if convinced by the showing made that there is no longer 
cause for continuing the period of probation, and if it be compatible with the public 
interest, terminate the sentence ... "1 (emphasis added). Ms. Karsten that the 
comma followed by the word "and" off two clauses that are applicable 
under two different circumstances. The first clause, which contains the phrase 
"continuing period of probation," is available to a movant prior to the expiration of 
probation. See State v. Guess, 154 Idaho 521, 527 n.3 (2013). In order to obtain relief, 
such a movant has the burden of establishing that there is no longer cause for 
continuing probation. The second clause, which contains the language "if it be 
compatible with the public interest," is available to a movant after the expiration of 
probation. In order to obtain relief, such a movant has the burden of establishing that 
the relief is compatible with the public interest. 
Ms. Karsten also recognizes that these two clauses could be read in conjunction 
and limit relief pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604(1) only to a movant who is currently on 
1 Idaho Code Section 19-2604 was amended by the legislature in 2014 and the new 
version of the statute was enacted on July 1, 2014, which was after the disposition of 
Ms. Karsten's motion to set aside her guilty plea and dismiss her judgment of 
conviction. (R., pp.107-109.) As such, this brief will reference the version of the statute 
that was applicable at the time of the disposition of her motion to set aside her guilty 
plea and dismiss her judgment of conviction. 
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probation. Id. Under that interpretation of the statute, the movant must establish that 
there is no longer cause to continue probation and that relief pursuant to I.C. § 19-
2604(1) is compatible with the public interest. 
Since there are two reasonable interpretations of this statute, it is ambiguous and 
the rule of lenity must be applied when interpreting I.C. § 19-2604(1 ). Moreover, from a 
policy perspective it make little sense for the legislature to afford a person whom was 
capable of completing probation without a violation less relief than a person whom has 
yet to complete probation. The reasoning being that the person who has completed 
probation and has not violated the terms of probation has provided more proof that s/he 
was truly rehabilitated and no longer poses a risk to society. 
8. Standard Of Review 
The ultimate determination of whether relief is available pursuant to I.C. § 19-
2604 rests within the discretion of the trial court. See State v. Shock, 133 Idaho 753, 
754 (Ct. App. 1999); see also Walborn v. Walborn, 120 Idaho 494, 500-501 (1991) 
(holding that the use of the word "may" as opposed to "shall" denotes a discretionary 
determination to be made by the trial court). "When a district court's discretionary 
decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to 
determine whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion, 
acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards 
applicable to the specific choices before it, and reached its decision by an exercise of 
reason." State v. Knutsen, 138 Idaho 918,923 (Ct. App. 2003). 
Statutory interpretation is a question of law over which Idaho appellate courts 
exercise free review. State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 361 (2013). The Idaho Supreme 
Court utilizes the following framework when interpreting a statute: 
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The interpretation of a statute ... must begin with the literal words 
of the statute; those words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary 
meaning; and the statute must be construed as a whole. If the statute is 
not ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but simply follows the law 
as written. A statute is ambiguous where the language is capable of more 
than one reasonable construction. 
City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Independent Highway Dist., 139 Idaho 65, 69 (2003). In 
the event a statute is deemed ambiguous, the rule of lenity provides that criminal 
statutes must be strictly construed in favor of defendants. State v. Anderson, 145 Idaho 
99, 103 (2008). Additionally, findings of fact will be upheld on appeal if they are 
supporied by substantial and competent evidence. State v. Hoyle, 140 Idaho 679, 682 
(2004). 
C. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Failed To Set Aside 
Ms. Karsten's Guilty Plea And Dismiss Her Judgment Of Conviction 
The district court ruled that under the plain language of I.C. § 19-2604(1 ), it did 
not have the discretion to provide Ms. Karsten the full relief she sought, because her 
probation had expired. (Tr., p.7, L.17 - p.9, L.9.) The district court abused its discretion, 
as it failed to recognize that it had the discretion to provide Ms. Karsten the full relief she 
sought pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604(1 ). Contrary to the district court's implicit ruling, 
I.C. § 19-2604(1) is an ambiguous statute because it can be read in a manner which 
does and does not empower the district court to provide relief after probation has 
expired. The applicable version of I.C. § 19-2604 provides: 
(1) If sentence has been imposed but suspended, or if sentence has been 
withheld, upon application of the defendant and upon satisfactory showing 
that: 
(a) The court did not find, and the defendant did not admit, in 
any probation violation proceeding that the defendant 
violated any of the terms or conditions of probation; or 
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(b) The has successfully completed and 
graduated from an drug court program or mental 
health court program and during any period of probation that 
may have been following such graduation, the court 
did not find, and the defendant did not admit, in any 
probation violation proceeding that the defendant violated 
any of the terms or conditions of probation; 
the court may, if convinced by the showing made that there is no longer 
cause for continuing the period of probation, and if it be compatible with 
the public interest, terminate the sentence or set aside the plea of guilty or 
conviction of the defendant, and finally dismiss the case and discharge the 
defendant or may amend the judgment of conviction from a term in the 
custody of the state board of correction to "confinement in a penal facility" 
for the number of days served prior to suspension, and the amended 
judgment may be deemed to be a misdemeanor conviction. This shall 
apply to the cases in which defendants have been convicted and granted 
probation by the court before this law goes into as as to cases 
which arise thereafter. The final dismissal of the case as herein provided 
shall have the effect of restoring defendant to his civil rights. 
§ 19-2604(1) (emphasis added). 
The underlined portion of the last paragraph of LC. § 19-2604( 1 ), sets forth two 
circumstances under which relief is available because the use of a comma before the 
word "and" indicates that the two clauses function independently of each other. The first 
clause applies if the movant is currently on probation. The second clause applies if the 
movant's probation has expired. If the legislature intended both of the clauses to be an 
indivisible unit, then it would not have separated the two clauses with a comma. 
Further, reading the two clauses as an indivisible unit requires this Court to ignore the 
comma. As such, the use of the comma after the word "and" indicates that the first two 
clauses of the last paragraph of I.C. § 19-2604(1) signifies two separate circumstances 
under which relief is available. 
Support for Ms. Karsten's position can be found in K Mart Corp. v. Idaho State 
Tax Comm'n, 111 Idaho 719 (1986). In that case, K Mart was challenging a use tax. Id. 
at 719-720. One of the arguments pursued by K Mart was the applicability of a 
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production exemption contained in a prior version of I.C. § 63-3622(d). Id. at 72·1. The 
version of I.C. § 63-3622(d), which was applicable in 1986 follows: 
63-3622. Exemptions. 
by this act the following: 
There are exempted from the taxes imposed 
(d) Receipts from the sale, storage, use or other 
consumption in this state of tangible personal property which 
will enter into and become an ingredient or component part 
of tangible personal property manufactured, processed, 
mined, produced or fabricated for ultimate sale at retail 
within or without this state, and tangible personal property 
primarily and directly used or consumed in or during such 
manufacturing, processing, mining, farming, or fabricating 
operations by a business or segment of a business which is 
primarily devoted to such operation or operations, provided 
that the use or consumption of such tangible personal 
property is necessary or essential to the performance of 
such operation .... 
I.C. § 63-3622 (emphasis added). The Idaho Supreme Court held that the use of the 
word "and" creates an exemption for two types of property, namely, property that 
becomes a component part of property sold at retail and property used or consumed in 
the production of property sold at retail. Id. at 721. The Court also held that the 
subsequent limitation clause that "businesses which is primarily devoted to such 
operation or operations" modifies both of the production exemption and the 
consumption exemption. Id. The Court treated the two clauses connected by a comma 
and the word "and" as two independent circumstances under which the tax exemption 
applies. 
The holding from K Mart is useful in this matter because the final paragraph of 
I.C. § 19-2604(1) is substantially similar to the tax exemption statute, I.C. § 63-3622, 
which was analyzed by the Idaho Supreme Court in the K Mart Opinion. Both of the 
statutes contain two clauses which are separated by a comma then the word "and." 
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Both of the statutes have subsequent provisos which modify both of the separate 
clauses. As such, this Court should interpret i.C. § 19-2604(1 ), in the same manner that 
the Idaho Supreme Court interpreted the applicable version of I.C. § 63-3622 in the 
K Mart Opinion. Under such an interpretation, the first clause of the last paragraph of 
I.C. § 19-2604(1 ), provides relief to people who are still on probation and who can 
convince the trial court that probation is no longer necessary. After making that 
showing, the trial court has the discretion to do anything from terminating the sentence 
to dismissing the judgment of conviction. The second clause of the last paragraph 
affords the same relief to a person who was completed probation and proves that such 
relief is compatible with the public interest. 
Support for Ms. Karsten's interpretation of the last paragraph of I.C. § 19-2604(1) 
can also be found in I.C. § 19-2604(1 )(b ). See Sweitzer v. Dean, 118 Idaho 568, 572 
(1990) ("It is the duty of the courts in construing statutes to harmonize and reconcile 
laws wherever possible and to adopt that construction of statutory provision which 
harmonizes and reconciles it with other statutory provisions."). Idaho Code Section 19-
2604(1 )(b) contemplates that relief pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604(1) is available both during 
a period of probation and after probation has expired. The applicable version of 
I.C. § 19-2604(1 )(b) follows: 
(b) The defendant has successfully completed and graduated from an 
authorized drug court program or mental health court program and during 
any period of probation that may have been served following such 
graduation, the court did not find, and the defendant did not admit, in any 
probation violation proceeding that the defendant violated any of the terms 
or conditions of probation; 
I.C. § 19-2604(1 )(b) (emphasis added). The use of the word "may" and the past tense 
word "served" after the phrase "any period of probation" is an indication that relief 
pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604(1) is available to a person who may or may not be on 
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probation after graduating from a specialty court program. Had the legislature intended 
relief to only be available to people who remain on probation after graduating from a 
specialty court, it would have used language indicating that a period of post-specialty 
court probation was a prerequisite for relief. For example, the legislature could have 
replaced "any" with "a" and "may" with "shall," i.e. "a period of probation that shall be 
served following such graduation." Such language would indicate that relief is only 
available pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604(1 ), if a period of probation was served after 
successfully graduating from a specialty court program. However, the legislature used 
language which suggests that relief is available pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604(1) if there is 
or if there isn't a period of probation following the graduation from a specialty court. In 
order to harmonize I.C. § 19-2604(1)(b) with the last paragraph of I.C. § 19-2604(1), this 
Court should hold that the district court had the power to set side Ms. Karsten's guilty 
plea and judgment of conviction even though her probation had expired. 
Moreover, Ms. Karsten's interpretation of I.C. § 19-2604(1) makes sense from a 
policy perspective. One of the most basic sentencing considerations is the notion that 
one's past actions are the best evidence of that person's rehabilitative potential. It 
follows that the longer a person goes without violating the law or a term of probation, the 
more likely that person has truly reformed. It makes little sense to provide greater relief 
to a person that has done less to prove that s/he has truly reformed than the person 
who has done more to prove that s/he has truly reformed. However, by limiting relief 
pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604(1) only to those who have not completed probation would 
preclude relief for those who have gone a longer time without a probation violation and 
have, therefore, done more to demonstrate true rehabilitation. Ms. Karsten surmises 
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that is what the district court was contemplating when it said that, "This is the most 
ridiculous statute that I've ever seen." (Tr., p.7, Ls.20-21.) 
Additionally, the district court's determination that it is in the public's interest to 
afford Ms. Karsten the maximum relief available under I.C. § 19-2604{1) was supported 
by substantial and competent evidence. The district court was very clear that it wanted 
its ruling to be overturned on appeal because it had "no doubt that Ms. Karsten has 
done very well and deserves" more relief than a reduction of her felony to a 
misdemeanor. (Tr., p.9, Ls.1-9.) At all times, Ms. Karsten complied with the terms of 
her probation and paid all of her fines and fees. (R., pp.101-102.) The instant offense 
is Ms. Karsten's only criminal conviction and, as such, was a deviation from her 
otherwise law abiding character. (R., pp.101-102.) Ms. Karsten also ended her 
relationship with Mr. Ferguson, married a different man, had two children, and, at the 
time she filed her motion to set aside her conviction, was pregnant with a third child. 
(R., p.102.) Ms. Karsten was also about to graduate from Brown Mackie College, with a 
Medical Assistance Degree. (R., p.102.) Her defense counsel also stated that her 
judgment of conviction will limit her employment opportunities in the medical industry. 
(R., p.99.) As such, the district court's determination that it would be compatible with 
the public interest to set aside Ms. Karsten's guilty plea and dismiss her judgment of 
conviction was supported by substantial and competent evidence. 
In sum, the last paragraph of I.C. § 19-2604(1) is ambiguous because it could be 
interpreted in manner which allows a district court to provide relief after the period of 
probation has expired. It could also be interpreted to mean that relief is only available 
before probation has expired. Since the statute is ambiguous, the rule of lenity applies 
and the statute must be interpreted in Ms. Karsten's favor. Moreover, it makes little 
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sense to deny someone like Ms. Karsten the maximum relief available under I.C. § 19-
2604, because she successfully completed her probation. In fact, the district court 
reluctantly denied Ms. Karsten the relief she requested, invited her to appeal, and 
pointed out that its ruling in this matter "makes no sense." (Tr., p.7, Ls.17 - p.9, L.9.) 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Karsten respectfully requests that this Court remand this matter for further 
proceedings with instructions that her guilty plea be set aside and her judgment of 
conviction be dismissed. 
DATED this 3rd day of December, 2014. 
SHAWN F. WILKERSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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